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Securing the Internet of Healthcare 
Scott J. Shackelford, JD, PhD*, Michael Mattioli, 
JD**, Steve Myers, PhD***, Austin Brady****, 
Yvette Wang***** & Stephanie Wong****** 
Cybersecurity, which includes the security of information 
technology (IT), is critical to ensuring that society trusts, and 
therefore can benefit from, modern technology. Problematically, 
though, rarely a day goes by without a news story related to how 
critical data has been exposed, exfiltrated, or otherwise 
inappropriately used or accessed as a result of supply chain 
vulnerabilities. From the Russian government’s campaign to 
influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election to the September 
2017 Equifax breach of more than 140 million Americans’ credit 
reports, cyber risk has become a topic of conversation in 
boardrooms and the White House, on Wall Street and main street. 
But these discussions often miss the problems replete in the 
expansive supply chains on which many of these products and 
services we depend on are built; this is particularly true in the 
medical device context. The problem recently made national news 
with the voluntary recall of more than 400,000 pacemakers that 
were found to be vulnerable to hackers, necessitating a firmware 
update. This Article explores the myriad vulnerabilities in the 
supply chain for medical devices, investigates existing FDA 
cybersecurity and privacy regulations to identify any potential 
governance gaps, and suggests a path forward to boost 
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cybersecurity due diligence for manufacturers by making use of 
new approaches and technologies, including blockchain. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Cybersecurity, including the security of information 
technology (IT), is critical to ensuring that society trusts, and 
therefore can benefit from, modern technology. Problematically, 
though, rarely a day goes by without a news story related to how 
critical data has been exposed, exfiltrated, or otherwise 
inappropriately used or accessed resulting in that trust being 
undermined. From the Russian government’s campaign to 
influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election1 to the September 
2017 Equifax breach of more than 140 million Americans’ credit 
reports,2 mitigating cyber risk has become a topic of 
conversation in boardrooms and the White House, on Wall Street 
and main street. This is increasingly the case, troublingly, 
among healthcare providers as both small practices and clinics 
                                                          
 1. See, e.g., Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, Inside a 3-Year Russian 
Campaign to Influence U.S. Voters, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/us/politics/russia-mueller-election.html. 
 2. Seena Greesin, The Equifax Data Breach: What to Do, FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/09 
/equifax-data-breach-what-do. 
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and major hospitals have been recent targets of ransomware 
campaigns. One variety, known as “Locky,” is among the “most 
prolific types of ransomware” infecting, for example, the 
Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center, resulting in “an 
‘internal emergency.’”3 
Despite the gravity of cyber risk facing healthcare providers 
and patients, commentators seldom discuss an important source 
of such risk: the often-expansive supply chains medical device 
manufacturers depend upon.4 Manufacturers of devices such as 
pacemaker systems purchase their components (e.g., microchips 
and software libraries) from multiple suppliers. As the number 
of such suppliers grows, so too does the number of opportunities 
potential wrongdoers can exploit. As the old proverb goes, a 
chain is only as strong as its weakest link. The problem recently 
made national news when the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) suggested a voluntary recall of more than 400,000 
pacemakers that were found to be vulnerable to hackers, 
necessitating a firmware update.5 This Article explores the 
vulnerabilities replete in the supply chain for medical devices, 
investigates both existing FDA cybersecurity and privacy 
regulations as well as industry codes of conduct to identify any 
potential governance gaps, and suggests a path forward to boost 
                                                          
 3. Charlie Osborne, Locky Ransomware Used to Target Hospitals Evolves, 
ZDNET (Nov. 7, 2017, 9:00 AM PST), http://www.zdnet.com/article/locky-
ransomware-used-to-target-hospitals-evolves/. 
 4. See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, Software Has a Serious Supply-Chain 
Security Problem, WIRED (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story 
/ccleaner-malware-supply-chain-software-security?mbid=nl_091817_daily 
&CNDID=%25%25CUST_ID%25%25 (explaining that consumers often hear 
warnings about websites or attachments in emails but are rarely warned about 
issues “further up the software supply chain”). 
 5. See Press Release, FDA, Firmware Update to Address Cybersecurity 
Vulnerabilities Identified in Abbott’s (Formerly St. Jude Medical’s) Implantable 
Cardiac Pacemakers: FDA Safety Communication (Aug. 29, 2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm573669.htm 
[hereinafter Firmware Update]. However, some, such as Professor Kevin Fu 
have questioned the veracity of these claims. See Eliza Strickland, Expert 
Questions Claim that St. Jude Pacemaker Was Hacked, IEEE SPECTRUM (Sept. 
2, 2016), https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-human-os/biomedical/devices/were-
pacemakers-from-st-jude-medical-really-hacked; see also Lars Noah, Turn the 
Beat Around: Deactivating Implanted Cardiac-Assist Devices, 39 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1229, 1243 (2013) (investigating pacemaker vulnerabilities); 
W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 
461 (2017) (“FDA has expressed some interest in expanding this approach to 
some medical software, describing in mid-2017 a possible program where 
trusted software developers could face lighter premarket security.”). 
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cybersecurity due diligence for manufacturers by making use of 
new approaches and technologies, including blockchain. 
Myriad vulnerabilities exist in securing the Internet of 
Healthcare, from the 3D printing of medical devices6 to foreign 
nation states interested in personal health records.7 The 
problem is far too broad to meaningfully explore in a single 
article, underscoring the need for additional research in this 
area. To help narrow our investigation, we focus on the 
suitability of blockchain technology to help: (1) promote 
cybersecurity due diligence in vulnerable supply chains, and (2) 
better secure and anonymize health records. The investigation 
is structured as follows. Part I summarizes security issues facing 
the Internet of Healthcare, including the literature on the 
“Internet of Bodies,” before focusing on supply chain concerns. 
Part II analyzes how blockchain technology can help address 
these security lapses. Part III reviews the lifecycle of a particular 
medical device—a pacemaker—and reviews the applicable 
federal and state cybersecurity requirements on manufacturers 
and hospitals using this device, along with how the Advanced 
Medical Technology Association (AdvaMed) is helping to create 
a cybersecurity code of conduct for industry. Part III also dives 
into the experience of one hospital, Eskenazi Health in 
Indianapolis, Indiana, to see how its administrators have 
implemented various safeguards to better secure their systems. 
Finally, Part IV focuses on implications for managers and 
policymakers interested in promoting cybersecurity due 
diligence in the healthcare industry. Ultimately, we propose that 
blockchain is a useful tool to help healthcare providers and 
manufactures mitigate certain supply chain and security risks 
but only as part of a larger universe of reforms needed to secure 
the Internet of Healthcare. 
                                                          
 6. See, e.g., Press Release, FDA, Statement by FDA Commissioner Scott 
Gottlieb, M.D., on FDA Ushering in New Era of 3D Printing of Medical 
Products; Provides Guidance to Manufacturers of Medical Devices (Dec. 4, 
2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements 
/ucm587547.htm (discussing the FDA’s work to regulate innovative medical 
technology, including 3D printing). 
 7. See, e.g., Drew Harwell & Ellen Nakashima, China Suspected in Major 
Hacking of Health Insurer, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/investigators-suspect-china-may-be-
responsible-for-hack-of-anthem/2015/02/05/25fbb36e-ad56-11e4-9c91-
e9d2f9fde644_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c7992683386c. 
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II. KEY ISSUES IN SECURING THE INTERNET OF 
HEALTHCARE 
It is easy to summon up a potential “parade of horribles” 
when considering the myriad risks to the Internet of Healthcare 
generally, or the Internet of Medical Devices in particular. 
According to Zach Rothstein of the trade group AdvaMed, the 
scale and gravity of such risks is an open and “very loaded 
question.”8 Ben Esslinger, a clinical engineer at Eskenazi 
Health, agrees: “Cybersecurity is an emergency management 
issue. This is an epidemic in which vulnerabilities are being 
exploited, and it can directly impact patient care.”9 But what 
sorts of vulnerabilities concern hospital administrators and 
medical device manufacturers most? Everything from issues 
with integrating multiple devices and sensors with different 
operating systems, which at times are no longer being patched 
with security updates, to protecting vital systems from 
ransomware campaigns.10 Privacy concerns can also complicate 
both the extent and manner in which data is stored on these 
disparate devices.11 
To help balance security and privacy concerns in the 
healthcare setting, most organizations have adopted a risk-
management approach, such as the National Institute for 
Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework 
(CSF).12 However, it is difficult to reduce risk in the realm of 
                                                          
 8. Interview with Zach Rothstein, AdvaMed, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 
22, 2018); see About AdvaMed, ADVAMED, https://www.advamed.org/about-
advamed (last visited Feb. 16, 2018) (“The Advanced Medical Technology 
Association (AdvaMed), is a trade association that leads the effort to advance 
medical technology in order to achieve healthier lives and healthier economies 
around the world. AdvaMed’s membership has reached nearly 300 members 
and more than 80 employees with a global presence in countries including 
Europe, India, China, Brazil, and Japan.”). 
 9. Interview with Ben Esslinger, Clinical Engineer, Eskenazi Health, in 
Indianapolis, Ind. (Jan. 23, 2018). 
 10. See HEALTH CARE INDUS. CYBERSEC. TASK FORCE, REPORT ON 
IMPROVING CYBERSECURITY IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 2, 28 (2017), 
https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/CyberTF/Documents/report2017.
pdf. 
 11. Id. at 9–11. 
 12. For more on the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, see Scott J. 
Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of Care?: Exploring 
the Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework on Shaping 
Reasonable National and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 305 (2015). 
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medical information technology. Reasons for this include: (1) 
differing regulatory regimes of devices, as explored in Part III; 
(2) complicated systems of device use that include both 
physicians and patients as well as hospital IT groups; (3) the 
personal and private nature of many of the pieces of information 
that these devices can collect, broadcast, and manipulate; (4) 
lethal or otherwise catastrophic failure modes for some of these 
devices; and (5) unique constraints on computational ability and 
power due to the need for a device to be portable and possibly 
even embedded in a person for medical reasons.13 Yet, despite 
these risks, the medical industry has been criticized for not being 
at the cybersecurity vanguard, as evidenced by the fact that 
many devices are now known to be susceptible to attacks.14 
Although evangelist groups such as “I Am The Cavalry” have 
been trying to publicize the issue for several years, the public 
has only just begun to appreciate these problems.15 The recent 
ransomware attacks on the U.K.’s health system16 seem to have 
raised the profile of the issue. Hollywood has also taken note: the 
show “Grey’s Anatomy” recently featured a two-part episode 
about a hospital that succumbs to a combination of malware and 
ransomware.17 
We next consider why cybersecurity risk reduction has been 
difficult in settings outside of healthcare, and explore why these 
problems may be further exacerbated in the medical field. The 
chief problems include: supply chain concerns, patching, 
management, and design. First, we need to consider the patient 
                                                          
 13. HEALTH CARE INDUS. CYBERSEC. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 8–16, 
18. 
 14. See Patrick Nohe, The Healthcare Industry Is Lagging Behind on 
Cybersecurity, SSL STORE (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.thesslstore.com/blog 
/healthcare-industry-cybersecurity-2018/ (citing a 2018 Security Scorecard 
report that ranks the healthcare industry “fifteenth in terms of cybersecurity 
health when compared to 17 other major U. S. industries”); see also Firmware 
Update, supra note 5. 
 15. I Am the Cavalry, I AM CAVALRY, https://www.iamthecavalry.org/ (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2018) (explaining that “I Am The Cavalry” is a global grassroots 
organization which focuses on the intersection of computer security and human 
life). 
 16. NHS ‘Could Have Prevented’ WannaCry Ransomware Attack, BBC 
(Oct. 27, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-41753022. 
 17. Grey’s Anatomy: Out of Nowhere, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com 
/title/tt7043730/?ref_=ttep_ep8 (last visited Apr. 8, 2018); Grey’s Anatomy: 1-
800-799-7233, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt7043736/?ref_=ttep_ep9 (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2018). 
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as part of the supply chain, which is admittedly a difficult 
undertaking given how complex these systems already are. The 
manufacturing process for Apple’s iPhone, for example, involves 
dozens of suppliers, all of which are shipping, assembling, and 
warehousing components before the final product is delivered to 
an Apple store, or your door.18 However, the limited runs for 
medical devices, at least when compared to the large runs that 
major corporations such as Apple and Amazon use for consumer 
devices, incentivize the reuse of commercial off-the-shelf 
hardware and software components whenever possible, and 
presumably the lowest cost supplier will win any bids for 
components.19 This may make medical devices more susceptible 
to attacks such as by supply chain components having embedded 
malware.20 The applicability of blockchain to help address 
supply chain issues is discussed in Part II. 
The practice of installing patches on FDA-approved devices 
has a rocky history. Initially, manufacturers were unclear as to 
whether patching a device for security reasons necessitated a 
recertification under FDA guidelines, as is discussed further in 
Part III. In 2016, the FDA clarified that patching for 
cybersecurity that did not significantly affect the operation of a 
                                                          
 18. See Ian Barker, The Global Supply Chain Behind the iPhone 6, BETA 
NEWS, https://betanews.com/2014/09/23/the-global-supply-chain-behind-the-
iphone-6/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2018). All of these steps introduce numerous 
opportunities for security problems to arise; recent research has even suggested 
hackers could use smartphone apps to destroy manufacturing equipment or 
even destroy entire factories. See Martin Giles, Hackers Could Blow Up 
Factories Using Smartphone Apps, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 11, 2018), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609946/hackers-could-blow-up-factories-
using-smartphone-apps/. Similar research was also published in an online 
article. See Scott J. Shackelford, Guarding Against the Possible Spectre in Every 
Machine, CONVERSATION (Jan. 22, 2018), https://theconversation.com 
/guarding-against-the-possible-spectre-in-every-machine-89825. 
 19. See Bill Graham, Reducing the Risk of the Software Supply Chain in 
Medical Devices, GRAMMATECH BLOG, http://blogs.grammatech.com/reducing-
the-risk-of-the-software-supply-chain-in-medical-devices (explaining that static 
analysis is one way to limit the risks of using third-party software). 
 20. See, e.g., Fahmida Y. Rashid, HP’s Malware-Laden Switches Illustrate 
Supply Chain Risks, PC MAG. (Apr. 12, 2012), https://securitywatch.pcmag 
.com/pc-hardware/296547-hp-s-malware-laden-switches-illustrate-supply-
chain-risks (discussing an example of a supply chain issue that occurred during 
the production of HP Switches, the switches were shipped with infected SD 
cards that could pose a risk to computers if they were repurposed). 
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medical device did not require recertification.21 Although this 
guidance has eased concerns, secure patching remains 
problematic for several reasons. First, because many devices are 
not consistently connected to the Internet, automatic patch 
download and deployment, which is standard for modern 
operating systems, is not an option.22 Second, some devices need 
specialized medical equipment or medical practitioners to be 
present for the patch to be applied. For example, pacemakers are 
embedded in the patient and need specialized radios to transmit 
updates; further, limited battery lives may limit the number of 
times one can perform a power-hungry update process.23 Third, 
the embedded nature of some medical devices means that they 
need to last a lifetime on a single battery and make the most 
efficient use of power possible. This can imply that traditional 
security means for ensuring the integrity and legitimacy of a 
patch cannot be deployed on some devices.24 
Yet another problematic aspect of patching medical devices 
is two-fold: long service lifespans combined with the inclusion of 
embedded non-programmable firmware. Currently, such long-
lived IT systems in nonmedical fields suffer from being 
vulnerable to long-known vulnerabilities that can be exploited 
by hackers since these devices cannot be easily reprogrammed, 
and thus patched, due to their embedded firmware.25 While 
security is achieved in many subsystems by replacing the item 
with a newer version of the product, this is not a suitable 
strategy for implanted medical devices such as pacemakers, 
discussed in Part III. Inconveniently, however, replacing a 
vulnerable device is sometimes the only solution. The recently 
                                                          
 21. See FDA, POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL 
DEVICES 9 (2016), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices 
/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm482022.pdf. 
 22. See Nourhene Ellouze et al., Security of Implantable Medical Devices: 
Limits, Requirements, and Proposals, 7 SECURITY COMM. NETWORKS 2475, 
2476–79 (2014), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/sec.939 
(explaining that due to power consumption limitations, fixes to security issues 
in implanted medical devices can be challenging). 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See Jeff Kampman, AMD Says CTS Labs Vulnerabilities Can Be 
Patched with New Firmware, TECH. REP. (Mar. 20, 2018), https://techreport 
.com/news/33400/amd-says-cts-labs-vulnerabilities-can-be-patched-with-new-
firmware; Kim Zetter, Why Firmware Is So Vulnerable to Hacking, and What 
Can Be Done About It, WIRED (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/02 
/firmware-vulnerable-hacking-can-done/. 
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discovered “Spectre” and “Meltdown” hardware bugs affecting 
nearly all CPUs, for instance, can only be entirely eliminated 
when affected chipsets eventually fall out of use. Replacing an 
implanted medical device affected by a hardware bug is not so 
easily done.26 
Beyond the challenges of patching software, medical devices 
require routine maintenance to ensure proper functioning, 
including accuracy, security, and privacy. This presents some 
distinct challenges. Managing medical devices often requires 
specialized medical knowledge, for instance. Moreover, several 
independent groups are frequently necessary to properly 
manage such devices when compared to non-medical systems. 
The groups who need to manage a device may include: (1) the 
device manufacturer, (2) a technician at a hospital or clinic, (3) 
the physician, (4) a home care assistant or nursing staff, and (5) 
the patient. Many of these groups will have differing educations, 
technical and medical backgrounds, and knowledge of the 
patient’s status. Increasing the number of individuals with 
which a system needs to interact in order to function properly, 
all of whom frequently have different security and privacy 
classifications, adds significant design requirements and 
constraints and makes constructing such systems more difficult, 
and thus more susceptible to attacks.27 Further, as previously 
mentioned, many of these devices will not have consistent 
Internet access, preventing them from being continuously 
monitored and updated as necessary. The lack of such live 
connection also limits the ability to centralize management, a 
technique that has successfully been used to improve security 
postures on devices while driving down maintenance costs.28 
A large number of traditional computer networking and 
defense techniques become unusable or problematic in health 
settings. We provide two examples. First, recently a court 
subpoenaed the audit logs on an individual’s pacemaker in 
                                                          
 26. See Shackelford, supra note 18; Lily Hay Newman, Medical Devices Are 
the Next Security Nightmare, WIRED (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.wired.com 
/2017/03/medical-devices-next-security-nightmare/. 
 27. See Jeff Clark, Is Complexity the Downfall of IT Security?, DATA CTR. J. 
(Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.datacenterjournal.com/complexity-downfall-
security/. 
 28. See Antone Gonsalves, Plans to Centralize Cybersecurity with DHS 
Seen as Step Forward, CSO (July 25, 2013), https://www.csoonline.com/article 
/2133770/malware-cybercrime/plans-to-centralize-cybersecurity-with-dhs-
seen-as-step-forward.html. 
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relation to an arson case.29 Should this practice become 
widespread, one can expect that consumers will insist on devices 
with limited or no logs in order to maintain their privacy. 
Second, embedded medical devices that have wireless radios 
such as Bluetooth or Wi-Fi may have unique identifiers built into 
the radio system that are broadcast on a continuous basis as part 
of the underlying radio protocol. Such identifiers are prolific and 
allow individuals to be tracked and geo-located through a 
number of different techniques. While this might be acceptable 
in a standard IT device that can be chosen not to be used, it is 
ethically more problematic on a device that must be worn.30 
In general, though, Rothstein reports that AdvaMed views 
healthcare cybersecurity as a “shared responsibility,” which 
resonates with the growing sentiment with regards to the utility 
of treating cybersecurity not just as an exercise in cost-benefit 
analysis, but as a social responsibility.31 Moreover, Rothstein 
reports some success in working with various partners toward 
this common goal, but challenges remain: 
Even if manufactures put the best security in place, if other parts of 
the system are insecure, these efforts might not matter. It has to be a 
joint effort, meaning that all players from designers to patients need 
to be involved. But getting all the players on the same page and 
working together is the toughest part.32 
III. HOW BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY CAN IMPROVE 
SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY 
The beginning of 2018 brought news that highlighted a 
longtime concern for security researchers: technological 
vulnerabilities can be rooted in hardware as well as software. 
Indeed, the hardware at the heart of nearly every computer, 
smartphone, tablet and other electronic device is flawed in at 
                                                          
 29. See Paul Rosenzweig, The Tell-Tale Heart, LAWFARE (July 14, 2017), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/tell-tale-heart. 
 30. See Meghnan Neal, The Internet of Bodies Is Coming, and You Could 
Get Hacked, MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 13, 2014), https://motherboard.vice.com 
/en_us/article/gvyqgm/the-internet-of-bodies-is-coming-and-you-could-get-
hacked. 
 31. For more on this topic, see Scott J. Shackelford et al., Sustainable 
Cybersecurity: Applying Lessons from the Green Movement to Managing Cyber 
Attacks, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1995 (2016). 
 32. Interview with Zach Rothstein, supra note 8. 
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least two significant ways.33 The newly discovered flaws, 
nicknamed “Meltdown” and “Spectre,” are chip-based 
weaknesses that let one user of a computer spy on other users—
even if they are using shared computer systems providing 
Internet services to large numbers of people, like iCloud, 
Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud Platform or Microsoft 
Azure.34 Chip companies and computer firms are working to fix 
the vulnerabilities, but the repairs can reportedly slow down 
computers and mobile devices by as much as thirty percent.35 
Corporate and academic researchers are still investigating how 
the problems were created, and how they persisted, unfound and 
unfixed, through more than twenty years of chip innovation.36 
Regardless of their cause, the pertinent fact is that too few firms 
are adequately securing their supply chains.37 
It is widely known that hackers can gain access to computer 
systems by exploiting software vulnerabilities or though “social 
engineering,” such as phishing schemes and other ruses.38 But 
another avenue of attack is by altering circuits that, like lines of 
                                                          
 33. See Meltdown and Spectre, https://spectreattack.com/ (last visited Apr. 
13, 2018); Michael Simon, Meltdown and Spectre CPU Flaws Affect All iOS and 
Mac Devices, but Don’t Panic, MAC WORLD (Jan. 5, 2018), 
https://www.macworld.com/article/3245778/apple-phone/apple-meltdown-
spectre-cpu-flaws-statement.html; What Are Spectre and Meltdown CPU 
Vulnerabilities and Are You Affected?, WINDOWS CLUB, 
http://www.thewindowsclub.com/what-is-spectre-and-meltdown-vulnerabilities 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2018). 
 34. See Joshua Long, Meltdown and Spectre: What Apple Users Need to 
Know, MAC SEC. BLOG (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.intego.com/mac-security-
blog/meltdown-and-spectre-what-apple-users-need-to-know/. 
 35. See Patrick Howell O’Neill, Industry Braces for Critical Intel Security 
Flaw Impacting a Decade’s Worth of Chips, CYBER SCOOP (Jan. 3, 2018), 
https://www.cyberscoop.com/intel-chip-flaw-virtual-memory-microsoft-
windows-linux/. 
 36. See Andy Greenberg, Triple Meltdown: How So Many Researchers 
Found a 20-Year-Old Chip Flaw at the Same Time, WIRED (Jan. 7, 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/story/meltdown-spectre-bug-collision-intel-chip-flaw-
discovery/. 
 37. See Dave Lewis, Digital Supply Chain (In)Security, FORBES (July 28, 
2014, 6:32 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davelewis/2014/07/28/digital-
supply-chain-insecurity/#628e15933869. 
 38. See, e.g., Arun Vishwanath, ‘Spearphishing’ Roiled the Presidential 
Campaign – Here’s How to Protect Yourself, CONVERSATION (Nov. 8, 2016), 
https://theconversation.com/spearphishing-roiled-the-presidential-campaign-
heres-how-to-protect-yourself-68274. 
416 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 19:2 
 
code, most users will never see.39 These physical devices that are 
the foundation of the complex supply chains involved in most 
high-tech manufacturing are very hard to secure, as was 
introduced in Part I.40 Each link in a supply chain highlights 
opportunities for hackers to exploit, which could damage 
equipment or even disable factories.41 But not all supply chain 
threats are malicious; sophisticated retailers like Amazon, for 
example, have been fooled by counterfeits.42 In 2015, Lenovo 
installed advertising software on its computers, dangerously 
weakening system security.43 But the focus here is on malicious 
supply chain vulnerabilities, as was highlighted in 2012 when 
Microsoft warned customers that Chinese computer factories 
were installing malware on PCs before they even left the 
production line.44 
As the Internet of Everything expands, the growing scale of 
the threat from hackers could easily be eclipsed by excitement 
over lower costs and smarter tech.45 A classic example of this 
                                                          
 39. See Andy Greenberg, This ‘Demonically Clever’ Backdoor Hides in a 
Tiny Slice of a Computer Chip, WIRED (June 1, 2016), https://www.wired.com 
/2016/06/demonically-clever-backdoor-hides-inside-computer-chip/. 
 40. See Barker, supra note 18. 
 41. See Martin Giles, Hackers Could Blow Up Factories Using Smartphone 
Apps, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s 
/609946/hackers-could-blow-up-factories-using-smartphone-apps/. 
 42. See Ari Levy, Amazon’s Chinese Counterfeit Problem Is Getting Worse, 
CNBC (July 8, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/08/amazons-chinese-
counterfeit-problem-is-getting-worse.html. 
 43. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The ‘Internet of Things’ Is Sending Us Back 
to the Middle Ages, CONVERSATION (Sept. 5, 2017), https://theconversation.com 
/the-internet-of-things-is-sending-us-back-to-the-middle-ages-81435; Elizabeth 
Weise, FTC Settles with Lenovo over a Built-in Snooping Software, $3.5 Million 
Fine, USA TODAY (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech 
/2017/09/05/ftc-settles-lenovo-over-built-snooping-software-scanned-users-
computers/632775001/. 
 44. See Malware Being Installed on Computers in Supply Chain, Warns 
Microsoft, GUARDIAN (Sept. 14, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com 
/technology/2012/sep/14/malware-installed-computers-factories-microsoft. 
 45. See Carl Franzen, How to Find a Hack-Proof Baby Monitor, OFFSPRING 
(Aug. 4, 2017), https://offspring.lifehacker.com/how-to-find-a-hack-proof-baby-
monitor-1797534985; John Markoff, Why Light Bulbs May Be the Next Hacker 
Target, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03 
/technology/why-light-bulbs-may-be-the-next-hacker-target.html?_r=0; Charlie 
Osborne, Smartwatch Security Fails to Impress: Top Devices Vulnerable to 
Cyberattack, ZDNET (July 22, 2015), http://www.zdnet.com/article/smartwatch-
security-fails-to-impress-top-devices-vulnerable-to-cyberattack/; Aaron Tilley, 
How Hackers Could Use a Nest Thermostat as an Entry Point into Your Home, 
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trend happened in 2009 when the U.S. Department of Defense 
bought 2,200 Sony PlayStation 3 gaming consoles to use as 
components in a military supercomputer under the commercial 
off-the-shelf program.46 But many of those systems were 
manufactured abroad, making it difficult to verify that they were 
not tampered with prior to their integration into critical U.S. 
infrastructure.47 
The Navy, at least, has learned from this mistake. The 
Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane Division, which is the third 
largest naval base in the world spread across more than 100 
square miles of Southern Indiana, has pioneered automated 
inspections, using artificial intelligence to examine digital 
pictures of new circuit boards to detect unauthorized 
alterations.48 The U.S. is rightly concerned about falling victim 
to this sort of attack—in part, because U.S. government agencies 
conduct them. Leaked documents have shown how the National 
Security Agency’s Tailored Access Operations team routinely 
intercepts shipments of new computer and networking 
equipment.49 Then, NSA workers modify the hardware to add 
vulnerabilities and secret access for NSA hackers to use later, 
and then put the equipment back in boxes to be delivered.50 
As explained in the Introduction and Part I, one new way to 
secure supply chains involves blockchain technology—a secure 
database system stored and maintained across many computers 
                                                          
FORBES (Mar. 6, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/aarontilley/2015/03/06 
/nest-thermostat-hack-home-network/#235d0d693986. 
 46. See Rosa Golijan, Department of Defense Buys 2,200 PS3s to Upgrade 
Supercomputer, GIZMODO (Nov. 29, 2009), https://gizmodo.com/5414938 
/department-of-defense-buys-2200-ps3s-to-upgrade-supercomputer. 
 47. See Scott J. Shackelford, How to Enhance Cybersecurity and Create 
American Jobs, HUFFINGTON POST (July 16, 2012), https://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/scott-j-shackelford/how-to-enhance-cybersecurity_b_1673860.html. 
 48. Press Release, Joe Donnelly, U.S. Senator for Ind., Donnelly Meets with 
NSWC Crane Expert, Praises Crane as a Leader in Protecting Country’s 
Critical Weapons and Cyber Systems Against Counterfeit Parts (Oct. 27, 2015), 
https://www.donnelly.senate.gov/newsroom/press/donnelly-meets-with-nswc-
crane-expert-praises-crane-as-a-leader-in-protecting-countrys-critical-
weapons-and-cyber-systems-against-counterfeit-parts. DARPA has pioneered a 
similar program utilizing blockchain tech. See Press Release, DARPA, DARPA 
Technology Identifies Counterfeit Microelectronics (Sept. 30, 2014), 
https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2014-09-30. 
 49. Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Dec. 29, 
2013), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-
toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html. 
 50. See id. 
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around the internet—to track and verify all aspects of a 
complicated supply chain like Apple’s. IBM and the 
international shipping giant Maersk are experimenting with 
using blockchain systems to better secure and transparently 
track shipments, as well as automate payments.51 This is one of 
the benefits of blockchain tech since the distributed smart 
contracts that these systems generate are automatically 
enforceable. Once a component part like a chip is delivered, for 
example, a blockchain verifies that fact and the supplier 
automatically is paid in dollars, or their cryptocurrency of choice. 
For those who might recall it, the peer-to-peer file sharing 
service Napster can be a useful onramp for understanding 
blockchain;52 indeed, the service spawned an array of popular 
services, from Skype to Spotify, as well as Bitcoin.53 What these 
diverse companies have in common is that none of their 
information is centrally archived; instead, they utilize, to a 
greater or lesser extent, “global spreadsheet[s]” that leverages 
peer-to-peer technology to authenticate transactions.54 Such a 
system enables transparency, and thus trust, in distributed 
systems that otherwise lack that invaluable feature.55 For 
example, every 10 minutes, on average,56 all new Bitcoin 
transactions are “verified, cleared, and stored in a block” that is, 
in turn “linked to the preceding block, thereby creating a 
                                                          
 51. Press Release, IBM, Maersk and IBM Unveil First Industry-Wide 
Cross-Border Supply Chain Solution on Blockchain (Mar. 5, 2017), https://www-
03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/51712.wss. 
 52. Lance Koonce, Are Blockchains the Second Coming of Napster? 
(Perspective), BLOOMBERG L.: BIG L. BUS. (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://biglawbusiness.com/are-blockchains-the-second-coming-of-napster-
perspective/; Don Tapscott & Alex Tapscott, Blockchain Revolution: How the 
Technology Behind Bitcoin Is Changing Money, Business and the World, TIME 
(May 6, 2016), http://time.com/4320254/blockchain-tech-behind-Bitcoin/. 
 53. Koonce, supra note 52. Spotify formerly used on peer-to-peer streaming 
for certain users, but has since eliminated that function, and relies wholly on 
server-based streaming. Romain Dillet, Spotify Removes Peer-to-Peer 
Technology from Its Desktop Client, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 17, 2014), 
https://techcrunch.com/2014/04/17/spotify-removes-peer-to-peer-technology-
from-its-desktop-client/. 
 54. See Nolan Bauerle, How Does Blockchain Technology Work?, COINDESK 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/information/how-does-
blockchain-technology-work/. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Joseph Bonneau, How Long Does It Take for a Bitcoin Transaction 
to Be Confirmed?, COIN CENTER (Nov. 3, 2015), https://coincenter.org/entry 
/how-long-does-it-take-for-a-bitcoin-transaction-to-be-confirmed. 
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chain.”57 Blocks that are not appropriately integrated are 
deemed invalid.58 In time, such blockchains can become a “World 
Wide Ledger of value.”59 
But no blockchain, nor any system on which a blockchain 
may be deployed, is one-hundred-percent secure; they are, for 
example, still susceptible to hardware vulnerabilities like 
Meltdown and Spectre.60 Moreover, in many ways blockchain is 
even harder to apply in the medical device context than, say, 
prescription drugs, given the complexity involved in these 
supply chains, as has been noted, as well as potential nation-
state motivations to compromise these devices,61 and the need 
for continuous updating as was described in Part I.62 There are 
also challenges with relying on this technology to help 
anonymize patient data.63 
At best, then, blockchain systems can be part of companies’ 
efforts to manage supply chain risks by making it much harder 
to tamper with products and easier to trade inputs such as by 
using RFID tags, as well as automating payment, warehousing, 
transport and delivery.64 As an example of the kind of fraud that 
                                                          
 57. Don Tapscott, Blockchain: The Ledger that Will Record Everything of 
Value to Humankind, WORLD. ECON. FORUM (July 5, 2017), https://www 
.weforum.org/agenda/2017/07/blockchain-the-ledger-that-will-record-
everything-of-value/.   
 58. See Bauerle, supra note 54. 
 59. See Don Tapscott & Alex Tapscott, Here’s Why Blockchains Will Change 
the World, FORTUNE (May 8, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/08/why-
blockchains-will-change-the-world/; see also Tapscott, supra note 57 (calling 
blockgain a “new digital ledger to record anything of value to humankind”). 
 60. Edmund Lee, Why Blockchains Can Be Really Bad. Or: How Techno-
Futurists Can Ruin Things, RECODE (June 19, 2016), https://www.recode.net 
/2016/6/19/11972818/dao-hacked-blockchain-ethereum. 
 61. See, e.g., Patricia A.H. Williams & Andrew J. Woodward, Cybersecurity 
Vulnerabilities in Medical Devices: A Complex Environment and Multifaceted 
Problem, 8 MED. DEVICES 305, 305 (2015). 
 62. Sitting atop these complications is the fact that, in many instances, 
incentives are not aligned for manufacturers to be forthcoming with regards to 
potential security defects, with a potential cautionary tale taking the form of 
the Volkswagen emissions scandal. See Russell Hotten, Volkswagen: The 
Scandal Explained, BBC (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-
34324772. 
 63. See Mike Orcutt, Who Will Build the Health-Care Blockchain?, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608821/who-
will-build-the-health-care-blockchain/. 
 64. How Blockchain Can Transform the Supply Chain, LOGISTICS BUREAU 
(Nov. 15, 2017), http://www.logisticsbureau.com/how-blockchain-can-
transform-the-supply-chain/. 
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could be avoided by using blockchain, consider so-called 
“fictitious pickups.”65 These happen when con artists show up at 
a shipper’s dock, show faked identification documents, and take 
a shipment. A blockchain would make it much harder for such a 
scheme to succeed since it would require consent by all of the 
users on the network.66 For example, in order for a delivery to 
Indianapolis to be cleared, each participant in the chain would 
have to affirmatively sign off on it by adding a new block to the 
chain. But this is just the tip of the iceberg of what’s possible. As 
reported by Steve Banker in Forbes, a firm called Kouvala 
envisions a scheme whereby pallets fitted out with RFID tags 
would ship themselves from A to B by advertising their needs. 
Shipping firms would then bid for the right to ship the load, and 
the pallet would, in effect, pick the best deal, which would be 
tracked in a blockchain.67 
To realize this dream, though, it is necessary to train people 
to use blockchains and agree on standards for data 
communication, encryption, and storage.68 And while such a 
system would still face the problem of insider threats, the 
underlying blockchain technology would make such attempts 
more difficult.69 What is needed is an all-out effort to leverage 
the work that leading organizations like Walmart,70 and the 
Department of Defense, in particular the DARPA SHIELD 
program, have accomplished, such as building out smart 
contracts using blockchain to help crystallize industry best 
practices.71 Public-private partnerships could start the process 
                                                          
 65. Steve Banker, Blockchain in the Supply Chain: Too Much Hype, 
FORBES (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevebanker/2017/09/01 
/blockchain-in-the-supply-chain-too-much-hype/#7cfdf1c1198c. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. An effort is now underway to take these steps by the Blockchain 
Governance Initiative, which is housed at the Indiana University Ostrom 
Workshop. See New Ostrom Workshop Blockchain Governance Initiative, 
OSTROM WORKSHOP, https://ostromworkshop.indiana.edu/resources/news 
/180412-new-blockchain.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2018). 
 69. Charlie Osborne, How Blockchain Technology Can Transform the 
Security Industry, ZDNET (Sept. 4, 2017), http://www.zdnet.com/article/how-
blockchain-technology-can-transform-the-security-industry/. 
 70. Robert Hackett, Walmart and 9 Food Giants Team Up on IBM 
Blockchain Plans, FORTUNE (Aug. 22, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/22 
/walmart-blockchain-ibm-food-nestle-unilever-tyson-dole/. 
 71. See Kerry Bernstein, Supply Chain Hardware Integrity for Electronics 
Defense (SHIELD), DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/program/supply-chain-
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of laying out appropriate standards to boost supply chain 
security and help pave the way for blockchain to help us create 
much more secure products, along with figuring out better ways 
to measure, model, and insure against cyber-attacks targeting 
hardware, such as pacemakers—the focus of the next Section. 
IV. MEDICAL DEVICE CASE STUDY 
This Part provides an in-depth view of how the current legal 
and regulatory framework affects the security of implantable 
pacemakers. We selected the pacemaker as the subject of this 
case study, in part, because security vulnerabilities in such 
devices have recently drawn widespread attention.72 Concerns 
about pacemaker software vulnerabilities date to at least 2007, 
when then-Vice President Dick Cheney deactivated some of the 
wireless capabilities of his pacemaker out of concern for his 
safety.73 Since then, cybersecurity vulnerabilities in pacemakers 
have been widely documented. In early 2017, St. Jude, a leading 
medical device manufacturer, patched a security vulnerability in 
one of its pacemaker systems that reportedly could have allowed 
attackers to drain the device’s battery, harmfully alter a 
wearer’s heart pacing, or deliver electrical shocks.74 More 
recently, an “exhaustive security evaluation of an implantable 
cardiac device ecosystem” published by two researchers in 2017 
                                                          
hardware-integrity-for-electronics-defense (last visited Jan. 17, 2018); 
Strengthening DOD Supply Chain Management, INNOVATEGOV (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2018), http://innovategov.org/2015/03/19/strengthening-dod-supply-
chain-management/. 
 72. See, e.g., Katherine Booth Wellington, Cyberattacks on Medical Devices 
and Hospital Networks: Legal Gaps and Regulatory Solutions, 30 SANTA CLARA 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 139 (2014); John G. Browning & Shawn Tuma, If Your Heart 
Skips a Beat, It May Have Been Hacked: Cybersecurity Concerns with Implanted 
Medical Devices, 67 S.C. L. REV. 637, 638 (2016); Eduard Marin et al., On the 
(In)Security of the Latest Generation Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators and 
How to Secure Them, PROC. 32ND ANNUAL CONF. ON COMPUTER SECURITY 
APPLICATIONS 226 (2016), https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/publications 
/article-2678.pdf. 
 73. See, e.g., U.S. Government Probes Medical Devices for Possible 
Cyberflaws, 21 WESTLAW J. MED. DEVICES 4 (2014). 
 74. See, e.g., Tom Spring, St. Jude Patches Additional Cardiac Device, 
THREAT POST (Feb. 7, 2017, 1:15PM), https://threatpost.com/st-jude-patches-
additional-cardiac-device/123596/; see also Newman, supra note 26; Firmware 
Update, supra note 5. 
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uncovered thousands of vulnerabilities and revealed 
unencrypted patient data.75 
This case study seeks to examine how well the current legal 
framework reduces the risk of cybersecurity threats in 
pacemakers, before moving on to discuss whether, and to what 
extent, industry practices are helping to fill any governance 
gaps.76 For that reason, the initial discussion focuses squarely 
on the FDA’s efforts to (i) prevent the commercialization of 
insecure devices, and (ii) prevent widespread harm to the public 
if problems are uncovered in devices that are already on the 
market. There are, of course, many other sources of law and 
regulatory power that could be implicated after a cybersecurity 
event has caused harm. For instance, personal identifying 
information of pacemaker users could be exposed in a large-scale 
security attack. Such an event could, in theory, lead to civil 
liability for device manufacturers and possibly even hospitals 
and doctors under laws governing disclosure of patient data.77 
These topics are beyond the scope of this case study because 
their primary function is backward-looking—that is, they 
address harms that have already occurred, and do not 
prospectively establish acceptable levels of risk to the public. 
The following discussion opens with a brief explanation of what 
pacemaker systems are, how they work, and the supply chains 
that make these devices possible. With this technological and 
industrial picture in place, the focus shifts to FDA regulation 
and guidance before moving on to the HIPAA Security Rule and 
relevant Federal Trade Commission (FTC) action. 
                                                          
 75. See Dan Goodin, Radio-Controlled Pacemakers Aren’t as Hard to Hack 
as You (May) Think, ARSTECHNICA (May 26, 2017), https://arstechnica.com 
/information-technology/2017/05/radio-controlled-pacemakers-arent-as-hard-
to-hack-as-you-may-think/. 
 76. For more on the overall security threat landscape facing medical 
devices, see generally Michael Woods, Cardiac Defribillators Need to Have a 
Bulletproof Vest: The National Security Risk Posed by the Lack of Cybersecurity 
in Implantable Medical Devices, 41 NOVA L. REV. 419, 419–27 (2017), which 
discusses the cybersecurity risk for implantable medical devices. 
 77. See, e.g., The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (HIPAA) 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e) (2013) (precluding healthcare providers 
from disclosing data such as names, zip codes, treatment dates, etc.). 
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A. OVERVIEW OF MODERN PACEMAKER SYSTEMS 
Pacemakers are widely used, remarkably reliable, and yet 
so inconspicuous that they can easily be underappreciated.78 For 
all their technological complexity, pacemakers rely upon a 
simple principle: through a pair of conductive wires attached to 
a user’s heart tissue, the device can sense abnormal heart 
rhythms.79 In response, the device supplies a gentle and 
carefully-timed electrical current to return the heart’s rhythm 
back to normal. Simply put, a pacemaker is a computer-
controlled metronome for the heart.80 
Each year, millions of patients’ lives are saved by 
pacemakers or implantable cardioverter defibrillators (ICD). 
According to 24/7 Wall Street, 235,567 peacemakers and 133,262 
ICDs were implanted in the United States in 2009, and the 
average cost of each procedure was $20,000 and $40,000, 
respectively.81 The risks are low: infection occurs in one to two 
percent of pacemaker surgeries and malfunctions involving the 
conductive leads occur at a rate of about four percent.82 Concerns 
over the security and privacy vulnerabilities in these devices 
loom large, however.83 
The technology that makes this elegant invention a reality 
is complex, but the most important components and their 
                                                          
 78. See, e.g., Amy Norton, More Americans Getting Pacemakers, REUTERS 
(Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-more-americans-getting-
pacemakers/more-americans-getting-pacemakers-idUSBRE88P1LN20120926 
(reporting millions of pacemakers installed as of 2009). Leading manufacturers 
of pacemakers include: Medtronic, St. Jude Medical (acquired by Abbott in 
2017), Boston Scientific, Abbott Labs, Edwards Lifesciences, and Johnson & 
Johnson. 
 79. Implantable Medical Devices, AM. HEART ASS’N, (Sept. 16, 2016), 
http://www.heart.org/HEARTORG/Conditions/HeartAttack/TreatmentofaHear
tAttack/Implantable-Medical-Devices_UCM_303940_Article.jsp. 
 80. VINOD KUMAR KHANNA, IMPLANTABLE MEDICAL ELECTRONICS: 
PROSTHETICS, DRUG DELIVERY, AND HEALTH MONITORING 267–70 (2016) 
(discussing cardiac pacemakers) (“The main function of a typical pacemaker is 
to detect and investigate the heartbeat of a person to find out if it is normal or 
irregular.”). 
 81. Baxter Allen, The Eleven Most Implanted Medical Devices in America, 
24/7 WALL ST. (July 18, 2011), https://247wallst.com/healthcare-economy/2011 
/07/18/the-eleven-most-implanted-medical-devices-in-america. 
 82. Id. 
 83. William H. Maisel & Tadayoshi Kohno, Improving the Security and 
Privacy of Implantable Medical Devices, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1164, 1164 
(2010). 
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functions are easily understood.84 Pacemaker systems 
(sometimes referred to as “ecosystems”85) are constellations of 
devices, software, and services.86 At the center of a pacemaker 
system is the implantable cardiac device.87 No larger than a 
wristwatch, such machines contain small computer control 
units, as well as software or firmware that detects abnormal 
heart rhythms and generates the electrical pulses necessary to 
restore normal rhythm.88 The implantable cardiac device also 
contains an antenna for sending diagnostic data to the outside 
world and for receiving commands.89 These devices are typically 
powered by lithium/ion batteries and surgically installed 
beneath a wearer’s skin.90 
                                                          
 84. Pacemakers, first invented in 1950s, have been greatly improved in 
their designs including smaller devices, longer lasting batteries, and more 
sophisticated communication systems. The device has three main components: 
a pulse generator with battery, one or more wires connecting the heart and the 
pulse generator, and electrode on each wire. The pulse generator, supported by 
a sealed lithium battery with an average eight years of life, produces electrical 
impulses from a complex circuitry. And the wire carries the electrical impulses 
between the heart and the generator, so the pacemaker can monitor and pace 
the heart’s rhythm. Once the pacemaker has been implanted, physicians would 
use a pacemaker programmer to test the device functionality and set patient 
therapy parameters. See generally BILLY RIOS & JONATHAN BUTTS, SECURITY 
EVALUATION OF THE IMPLANTABLE CARDIAC DEVICE ECOSYSTEM 
ARCHITECTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION INTERDEPENDENCIES 4–5 (2017), 
https://www.a51.nl/sites/default/files/pdf/Pacemaker%20Ecosystem%20Evalua
tion.pdf. A pacemaker programmer may vary from manufacturers to 
manufactures but is a critical tool to monitor and even reprogram the 
pacemaker. It communicates with the pacemaker via radio frequency (RF) 
technology. Similarly, patients can also choose to remotely transmit their data 
from their home monitoring device to clinical physicians and save their time to 
clinic visits. The remote monitoring relies on a patient support network that 
also allows vendors to register and upgrade the monitor device. Id. at 5. 
 85. Pacemakers and ICDs, together with physician programmers, home 
monitoring device, and patient support network comprise an interdependent 
implantable cardiac device ecosystem. Id. at 4. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See, e.g., KHANNA, supra note 80. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 283 (discussing wireless sending and receiving of information via 
antenna). 
 90. See, e.g., How Pacemakers Work, BOS. SCI., http://www.bostonscientific 
.com/en-US/patients/about-your-device/pacemakers/how-pacemakers-
work.html (last visited April 1, 2018). 
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A second important component is called a “programmer.”91 
In simple terms, a programmer is a computer that doctors use in 
a clinical setting (e.g., a physician’s office) to wirelessly 
communicate with an implanted cardiac device.92 Although 
programmers are typically used to examine the functioning of a 
patient’s heart, they also can be used to perform firmware 
upgrades—i.e., to send new firmware and installation 
commands to the computer control unit in an implanted cardiac 
device.93 
Patients and doctors can also monitor pacemaker data 
outside of clinical settings with devices called “base stations.”94 
Usually situated in a patient’s home, a base station retrieves 
pacemaker data wirelessly from an implanted cardiac device, 
and transmits it (e.g., over the internet using Wi-Fi or cellular 
data connections) to a physician’s office.95 Often, the 
transmission of this data is mediated by a dedicated patient 
support network—an online service that routes pacemaker data 
(including alerts indicating abnormal heart rhythm) to patients 
and doctors.96 
Since the first pacemakers were commercialized in the 
1950s, the foregoing components have become smaller, more 
complex, and consequently, more vulnerable to security attacks. 
The recent introduction of smartphone apps to pacemaker 
systems has increased such risks. These apps allow a standard 
smartphone to function as a mobile base station that can retrieve 
data directly from a pacemaker and send it to a doctor over the 
internet.97 
                                                          
 91. See KHANNA, supra note 80, at 284 (discussing programmers); see also 
Marin et al., supra note 72, at 226–36 (discussing vulnerabilities in 
programmers). 
 92. KHANNA, supra note 80, at 284; see also Preliminary Expert Report of 
Carl D. Livitt at 3, 18, 25, St. Jude Medical, Inc. v. Muddy Waters Consulting, 
Case No. 0:16-cv-03002 (DWF/JSM) (D. Minn. Oct. 23, 2016) (discussing 
exclusive use of programmer devices by physicians). 
 93. KHANNA, supra note 80, at 284. 
 94. See, e.g., Marin et al., supra note 72, at 226–36 (“ . . . base stations, 
installed in the patients’ home, allow remote monitoring by gathering telemetry 
data from the ICD and sending this data to the hospital.”).  
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See., e.g., MEDTRONIC, MyCarelink Smart U.S., http://www.medtronic 
.com/us-en/mobileapps/patient-caregiver/mycarelink-smart-us.html (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2018). 
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Pacemaker manufacturers rely on networks of suppliers for 
many of the electronic components and software packages that 
go into the devices they sell.98 The widely-publicized 2017 
pacemaker security report mentioned earlier reveals, for 
instance, off-the-shelf microprocessors used in home monitoring 
base stations, software libraries supplied by third parties, and 
removable third-party hard drives used in physician 
programmers.99 Drawing on these examples and other publicly 
available information, Figure 1 below depicts a hypothetical 
pacemaker supply chain. 
 
 
Figure 1: Hypothetical Pacemaker Supply Chain 
Each rectangle in Figure 1 represents a unique company or 
institution that supplies a component or material that 
eventually is assembled and later packaged and sold by a 
manufacturer. As is evident, although perhaps not as complex 
and global as the supply chain for Apple’s iPhone referenced in 
Part II, this manufacturing process still leaves plenty of space 
                                                          
 98. Billy Rios & Jonathan Butts, Understanding Pacemaker Systems 
Cybersecurity, WHITESCOPE IO (May 23, 2017), http://blog.whitescope.io 
/2017/05/understanding-pacemaker-systems.html. 
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for security vulnerabilities and, as a result, has becoming 
increasingly regulated. 
B. PACEMAKER SECURITY VULNERABILITIES 
The device-to-device communications within a pacemaker 
ecosystem and the inherent vulnerabilities underlying the 
subsystems create security and privacy risks.100 Ideally, 
manufacturers and vendors would implement robust safeguards 
to balance safety, reliability, complexity, power consumption, 
and cost. In reality, however, manufacturers have few incentives 
to improve security mechanisms that might slow down 
regulatory approval (discussed in the next sub-part).101 In 2017, 
a report from WhiteScope highlighted industry-wide security 
weaknesses with pacemaker programmers: the researchers 
discovered over 8,000 vulnerabilities in outdated third-party 
libraries from four programmers built by four different 
vendors.102 Among a long list of flaws, researchers found that 
pacemaker programmers do not authenticate to pacemaker 
devices and can reprogram any pacemaker from the same 
manufacturer; additionally, unencrypted patient data is stored 
on the programmers.103 Focusing on radio-based (i.e., wireless) 
attacks, in 2008 another group of researchers showed that an 
unauthorized party equipped with a software radio within range 
of an implanted cardiac device could launch a denial-of-service 
attack, depleting the device’s battery and exposing unencrypted 
patient information from RF signals.104 
Although there have been some notable recalls of 
implantable cardiac devices in recent years, the massive 2017 
recall of Abbott Laboratories’ (formerly St. Jude Medical) 
465,000 implanted pacemakers in the U.S. market is a stark 
example of the potential harm that a cyberattack on medical 
                                                          
 100. Id. at 21–22. 
 101. Wayne Burleson et al., Design Challenges for Secure Implantable 
Medical Devices 1 (June 3–7, 2012), https://spqr.eecs.umich.edu/papers/49SS2-
3_burleson.pdf (conference paper) (archived with the Security and Privacy 
Research Group at the University of Michigan). 
 102. RIOS & BUTTS, supra note 84, at 13. 
 103. Id. at 20. 
 104. Daniel Halperin et al., Pacemaker and Implantable Cardiac 
Defibrillators: Software Radio Attacks and Zero-Power Defenses, 2008 IEEE 
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devices could do.105 On August 29, 2017, The Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) released a safety communication 
regarding the identified cybersecurity vulnerabilities in St. Jude 
Medical’s pacemakers.106 In the notice, the FDA recognized that 
as programmable medical devices become increasingly 
networked, there is an increased risk of exploitation of 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities.107 A related report published by 
ICS-CERT, a special cybersecurity group within the Department 
of Homeland Security, indicated three vulnerabilities related to 
radio communications in the affected devices: (1) the 
pacemaker’s authentication algorithm can be compromised or 
bypassed; (2) the pacemakers do not restrict the number of 
correctly formatted “RF wake-up” commands that can be 
received; (3) some models of pacemakers transmit unencrypted 
patient information to programmers and home monitoring 
units.108 To exploit these vulnerabilities, an unauthorized user 
would send radio signals to modify a pacemaker’s programming 
commands, which would result in patient harm from rapid 
battery depletion to inappropriate pacing.109 
Fortunately, remedial steps have helped lower the risk of 
harm to pacemaker users. The FDA approved St. Jude Medical’s 
firmware update as a corrective action (recall) to ensure that it 
addressed these vulnerabilities and reduced the risk of 
exploitation.110 The firmware update will implement “RF wake-
up” protections and limit the commands that can be issued to 
                                                          
 105. Michael Mezher, Abbott Recalls 465,000 Pacemakers for Cybersecurity 
Patch, REG. AFF. PROFS. SOC’Y (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.raps.org 
/regulatory-focus™/news-articles/2017/8/abbott-recalls-465,000-pacemakers-
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 106. See Firmware Update, supra note 5. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Abbott Laboratories’ Accent/Anthem, Accent MRI, Assurity/Allure, and 
Assurity MRI Pacemaker Vulnerabilities, ICS-CERT (Aug. 29, 2017), https://ics-
cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSMA-17-241-01. 
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 110. Mezher, supra note 105. 
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pacemakers via RF communications.111 In addition, the updated 
pacemaker firmware will prevent unencrypted transmission of 
patient information.112 But the firmware update has to be 
applied during an in-person patient visit with a healthcare 
provider via the Merlin PCS Programmer.113 As with any 
firmware update, physicians are recommended to consider the 
possible risk of an update malfunction along with the potential 
risk of a cybersecurity attack.114 However, a replacement of 
implanted pacemaker is not recommended.115 The FDA suggests 
that the implementation of the firmware update should be 
determined based on the physician’s professional judgment and 
patient management considerations.116 
The cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the St. Jude Medical’s 
pacemakers may only reveal the tip of the iceberg. Designers in 
the implantable cardiac medical devices often face trade-offs 
between heightened cybersecurity posture and patient care 
considerations, such as safety, utility, and cost of power 
consumption.117 Manufactures, vendors, and the healthcare 
industry writ large have not done enough to make their 
ecosystem resilient to cyber risks.118 And they generally are not 
willing to share with public the security measures they may 
employ in their proprietary systems.119 The next section 
investigates the potential of new regulations to address these 
security and privacy concerns in implantable cardiac medical 
devices. 
C. FDA REGULATION OF MEDICAL DEVICES 
Established in 1906, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) is the primary federal agency responsible for overseeing 
the safety of medical devices such as pacemakers.120 When 
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Congress granted the agency this authority in the 1930s, 
however, the term “medical device” typically referred to 
relatively simple tools used by doctors and surgeons at the 
time.121 Since then, advances in mechanical engineering, 
computerization, and software design have enabled the 
development of sophisticated devices that address many types of 
medical problems.122 This advancement is reflected in the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s broad definition of a 
medical device: 
[A]n instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, 
implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including 
any component, part, or accessory, which is . . . intended for use in the 
diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease . . . or intended to affect the 
structure or any function of the body . . . 123 
This definition limits the scope the FDA is permitted to take 
by focusing only on devices that help heal or otherwise affect a 
patient’s body as opposed to the constellation of devices that 
support a health provider’s practice.124 Working within these 
limitations, the FDA provides guidance to device manufacturers 
and healthcare providers on medical device cybersecurity.125 
This “total lifecycle product approach” places the FDA in the role 
of supervisor—monitoring device manufacturers to see if they 
market products with robust security protections, and whether 
or not they continue to update the devices with post-market 
patches.126 Importantly, however, some software functions are 
expressly excluded from this definition.127 The FDA tries to 
reduce the risk that dangerous devices are sold, in part, by 
                                                          
2009, at 20, https://www.morganlewis.com/~/media/files/publication/outside 
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 122. See Carol Rados, Medical Device and Radiological Health Regulations 
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 124. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3060, 130 Stat. 1033, 
1130 (2016) (clarifying the definition and excluding some medical software). 
 125. Suzanne Schwartz, FDA’s Role in Medical Device Cybersecurity, FDA 
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255, § 3060, 130 Stat. 1033, 1130 (2016). 
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requiring medical device manufacturers to demonstrate the 
safety of their products before selling them.128 In connection with 
this function, the FDA often issues guidance and 
recommendations to manufacturers.129 The FDA also has the 
authority to take remedial steps: if a device manufacturer 
discovers that its FDA-cleared product is unsafe, it must convey 
this information to the FDA, which then may take various 
regulatory actions including notifying the public or recalling the 
product.130 
The backbone of the FDA’s compliance framework for 
medical devices is a classification system comprised of three 
levels—Class I, Class II, and Class III—each of which signify the 
level of risk a device presents, and the corresponding level of 
oversight required.131 According to guidance published by the 
FDA, Class I devices require only compliance with “general 
controls” that apply to all classes of medical devices.132 Such 
controls include, for instance, good manufacturing practices or 
labeling requirements. The safety of Class II devices, by 
contrast, requires information not captured by the general 
controls that apply to Class I devices—for instance, evidence 
that the device meets specific performance standards or 
guidelines promulgated by the FDA.133 Such information may be 
included within a premarket notification document (often called 
a “510(k)” document), demonstrating that the device to be 
marketed presents a low risk to consumers.134 The safety of 
                                                          
 128. Schwartz, supra note 125. 
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 130. Cf. Merrill, supra note 121, at 1808. As Richard Merrill explained in a 
landmark paper on FDA oversight of medical devices, since the 1970s, the FDA 
has had the authority “to ban worthless or dangerous products 
administratively, and to require notification, replacement, and/or refund by 
makers of defective products.” Id. 
 131. Charlotte A. Tschider, Enhancing Cybersecurity for the Digital Health 
Marketplace, 26 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 20–21 (2017), http://www 
.annalsofhealthlaw.com/annalsofhealthlaw/vol__26_issue_1?pg=4#pg4. 
 132. FDA, THE 510(K) PROGRAM: EVALUATING SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE 
IN PREMARKET NOTIFICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION STAFF 2 (2014), https://www.fda.gov/downloads 
/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM284
443.pdf. 
 133. Id. at 2 n.2. 
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Class III devices, meanwhile, cannot be determined from general 
controls or from additional submissions relating to performance 
standards alone.135 These devices must receive FDA approval 
before they can be commercialized.136 The FDA classifies new 
medical devices—i.e., devices marketed after the Medical 
Devices Amendments of 1976 that are not substantially 
equivalent to a legally marketed device—as “Class III” by 
default.137 As Charlotte A. Tschider has explained: “How the 
device is used and its connection to sustaining human life (in 
comparison to diagnostic or therapeutic uses) determines its 
final classification.”138 
In some respects, it easy to evaluate how a typical 
pacemaker system would be examined under this framework: 
The FDA has established and published classifications for 
approximately 1,700 generic medical devices, including 
pacemakers.139 For instance, implantable pacemaker pulse 
generators, programmers used by doctors, and pacemaker repair 
or replacement materials are all classified under the regulations 
as “Class III” devices requiring FDA approval.140 By contrast, 
devices used to test the proper functioning of a pacemaker are 
categorized under Class II, requiring only compliance with 
general controls and performance characteristics.141 Likewise, 
electrical chargers used to wirelessly recharge the battery in a 
pacemaker are defined as Class I devices, requiring only 
compliance with general controls prior to commercial sale.142 
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The FDA’s oversight of software in a pacemaker system is 
more difficult to evaluate, however, and could be less rigorous 
than its evaluation of physical devices.143 The FDA has long 
regulated certain kinds of software, and certain software 
functions are explicitly excluded from the FDA’s definition of 
medical devices altogether. Against that backdrop, however, 
Congress recently passed legislation that indicates the FDA 
may, in its discretion, regulate software critical to patient 
health.144 This suggests at the very least that algorithms 
(implemented in software or firmware) designed to detect 
abnormal heart rhythms or firmware controlling the generation 
of electrical pulses would likely be regulated “devices.” 
The evaluation of smartphone apps is less certain, however. 
In 2015, the agency published a document that set out to clarify 
“the subset of mobile apps to which the FDA intends to apply its 
authority.”145 The document explains that it plans to regulate 
“[m]obile apps that are an extension of one or more medical 
devices by connecting to such device(s) for purposes of 
controlling the device(s) or for use in active patient monitoring 
or analyzing medical device data.”146 This strongly suggests that 
an app used in connection with a pacemaker could be a regulated 
device. However, the FDA has indicated that it “may” decline to 
regulate “[m]obile apps that provide patients a portal into their 
own health information, such as access to information captured 
during a previous clinical visit or historical trending and 
comparison of vital signs (e.g., body temperature, heart rate, 
blood pressure, or respiratory rate).”147 Ultimately, it seems that 
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the FDA will not categorically regulate apps distributed for use 
with pacemakers; rather, whether a pacemaker app will be 
regulated, and the degree of regulation it might receive, will be 
determined in an ad hoc fashion, depending on the specific 
functions of the app. 
Beyond the classification and regulation of devices, the FDA 
has treated cybersecurity concerns in pacemaker systems with a 
light touch. The agency has shown a preference for issuing 
general guidance rather than mandating security standards or 
subjecting devices to rigorous testing. In a 2005 advisory 
publication, for instance, the FDA laid out a largely hands-off 
approach to cybersecurity risks presented by off-the-shelf 
software, assuring manufacturers that there is typically no need 
to report software patches to the FDA prior to supplying such 
patches to consumers and doctors.148 In 2014, the FDA published 
new cybersecurity guidance focused on how device 
manufacturers can best prepare their devices for 
commercialization.149 Like the 2005 document, these guidelines 
were not legally enforceable, instead reflecting only the agency’s 
“current thinking” on the topic.150 The document encouraged 
device manufacturers to “consider” cybersecurity risks and 
reasonably preventative steps such as authentication systems to 
ensure that only authorized users and software can access 
devices. The FDA cautioned, however, against overly 
cumbersome security measures that “could unreasonably hinder 
access to a device intended to be used during an emergency 
situation.”151 In addition, the FDA encouraged device 
manufacturers to describe in premarket notifications any steps 
taken (e.g., design considerations and related analyses) to 
reduce cybersecurity risks.152 
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Acknowledging that cybersecurity risks cannot be 
eliminated entirely through premarket steps alone, the FDA 
published a set of post-market guidelines in 2016.153 Like the 
2014 document, these guidelines contained non-binding advice 
and suggestions. The guidelines advised manufacturers to 
“establish, document, and maintain throughout the medical 
device lifecycle an ongoing process for identifying hazards 
associated with the cybersecurity of a medical device, estimating 
and evaluating the associated risks, controlling these risks, and 
monitoring the effectiveness of the controls.”154 A theme 
throughout the document was the need for manufacturers to 
make and follow clearly documented plans and procedures 
aimed at reducing patient risks: “Manufacturers should have a 
defined process to systematically conduct a risk evaluation and 
determine whether a cybersecurity vulnerability affecting a 
medical device presents an acceptable or unacceptable risk.”155 
Relevant to pacemaker manufacturers, the 2016 post-
market guidelines offered advice on when new reporting to the 
FDA is necessary for software patches. The document explained 
that “regularly scheduled security updates or patches to a device, 
including upgrades to the software, firmware, programmable 
logic, hardware, or security of a device to increase device 
security, as well as updates or patches to address vulnerabilities 
associated with controlled risk” are considered by the FDA to be 
“enhancements” rather than “repairs” and, consequently, do not 
require notification.156 By contrast, software patches that 
address urgent threats to patient safety—i.e., “where there is 
unacceptable residual risk of patient harm due to [the absence 
of additional] risk mitigations”—must be reported to the FDA.157 
In exchange for allowing manufacturers to manage postmarket 
security, the guidance states that the FDA strongly recommends 
manufacturer adoption of effective cybersecurity practices—
notably, the NIST Framework for critical infrastructure.158 
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In light of the recent revelations about pacemaker 
vulnerabilities, legal commentators have criticized the FDA for 
not taking a firmer stand on cybersecurity. One commentator 
recently summarized the FDA’s posture in this regard as follows: 
Indeed, the FDA heavily relies on guidance to oversee software. 
Agency documents that summarize the FDA’s approach generally cite 
to the same cluster of five guidances. Together, these documents form 
a cascade of quasi-regulation, recommendations, and “current 
thinking,” but offer few firm rules. Software does not stand on terra 
firma with the FDA.159 
This comment is representative of a vein of recent scholarly 
criticism directed at the FDA’s reliance on guidance in place of 
notice and comment rulemaking.160 
This brief look at pacemaker security suggests that at least 
some level of concern is well-founded: recent security reports 
have clearly documented security flaws in pacemakers that have 
been widely sold and installed by doctors. These flaws are highly 
technical, but an engineering degree is not needed to understand 
their sources: modern pacemaker systems rely upon complex 
supply chains, sophisticated software, along with Internet 
control and access. To help address them, the FDA entered into 
a Memorandum of Understanding with the National Health 
Information Sharing and Analysis Center and the Medical 
Device Innovation, Safety, and Security Consortium. By 
“enabl[ing] an operational framework for medical device 
vulnerability information-sharing,” the partnership allows the 
FDA to continue to stay abreast of vulnerability fixes that are 
not subject to the premarket review process.161 This approach is 
consistent with the information sharing approach adopted by 
other departments such as DHS’s Critical Infrastructure 
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Protection162 and the Treasury’s FinCEN Exchange for financial 
crimes.163 
These observations are all the more concerning when 
considered alongside the FDA’s preference for an advisory role 
on cybersecurity matters and its somewhat vague indications 
concerning future oversight of software. In summary, 
cybersecurity risks to pacemakers are likely higher than 
consumers might wish, but the FDA appears disinterested at 
present in adopting a more assertive stance. But, it is not the 
only game in town. 
D. HIPAA SECURITY RULE 
Regulation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices in the 
healthcare arena comes from two primary sources, FDA 
regulation and the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule.164 This section 
discusses why HIPAA’s security rule may be a useful tool for 
regulators seeking to secure a covered entity’s network. It is 
important to note that HIPAA’s Security Rule may apply to 
regulation of the medical IoT supply chain in a roundabout way. 
The Security Rule requires appropriate measures be taken to 
safeguard any electronic protected health information (PHI).165 
IoT devices that do not meet the definition of medical devices do 
not generally store PHI, making the security rule seem 
inapplicable.166 That is, unless one accounts for the attack vector 
that insecure IoT devices provide. For example, should a hospital 
install smart thermostats or lights, those IoT devices would 
understandably avoid any application of the medical device 
definition. However, because the thermostat is connected to the 
hospital’s network, it provides an avenue for attackers to 
infiltrate the network and gain access to the PHI stored within. 
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In this way, the Security Rule can fill in the gaps left by the 
narrower definition of medical devices. 
While the Security Rule only applies to covered entities, 
such as healthcare providers, and does not apply to medical 
device manufacturers,167 it may nonetheless help spur device 
manufacturers to design with security in mind. If a healthcare 
provider does not feel that a given IoT device is secure enough, 
and, for example, could open them up to liability for a breach of 
the security rule, they will likely decline to allow the device on 
their network. As health providers continue becoming more 
sophisticated and savvy about their overall network security,168 
medical device manufacturers and regulators should consider 
the impact of the Security Rule on IoT devices in the healthcare 
supply chain as part of a broader universe of reforms needed. 
E. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT 
If a device manufacturer is not one of HIPAA’s covered 
entities, and the IoT device does not meet the definition of a 
medical device,169 a manufacturer may still be subject to the FTC 
Act. In fact, the FTC sees its role as co-partners with the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), filling in the 
gaps where HIPAA is absent: “Indeed, the FTC Act is currently 
the primary federal statute applicable to the privacy and 
security practices of non-HIPAA covered businesses that collect 
individually identifiable health information.”170 As a result, it is 
highly relevant to any study of cybersecurity in the healthcare 
context. 
The FTC has adopted a reasonableness standard for 
regulating the security practices for non-HIPAA covered 
entities.171 In this way, unlike HIPAA’s binary approach, 
industry norms have the potential to affect federal enforcement 
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practices. The FTC Act’s prohibition against “unfair or deceptive 
trade practices”172 results in enforcement against companies 
that break their promises to consumers through a failure to 
implement “reasonable” security practices or by going beyond 
the scope of consent.173 Generally, these failures occur as the 
result of a data breach, but are just as likely to stem from 
security failures in IoT devices.174 
The reasonableness standard means that following FTC 
recommendations can help device manufacturers avoid liability. 
In 2017, Acting Director Thomas Pahl’s recommendations 
included: (1) “don’t misrepresent the level of security you 
provide”; (2) “protect against well-known, foreseeable threats”; 
and (3) “take advantage of” guidance issued by federal 
agencies.175 The FTC’s earlier IoT report in 2015 provided 
specific security guidelines including “security by design,” 
promoting a culture of security, secure third-party service 
providers, “defense in depth,” and reasonable access control 
measures.176 It is likely that as implementation of these 
practices and others become industry norms, failure to adopt 
them will place non-HIPAA covered entities in unreasonable 
territory—risking FTC scrutiny. 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND 
POLICYMAKERS 
Despite the efforts of U.S. regulatory agencies, particularly 
the FDA, as has been made clear, there are security gaps 
remaining that, in some cases, are being filled by industry codes 
of conduct. This final Part examines the extent to which industry 
norm entrepreneurs can succeed where other stakeholders have 
thus far failed to secure vulnerable medical devices, particularly 
pacemakers. The Part begins with an overview of industry best 
                                                          
 172. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
 173. See, e.g., In re PaymentsMD, LLC, 159 F.T.C. 241 (2015) (decision and 
order) (punishing collection of data beyond the scope of consumers’ consent); In 
re Rite Aid Corp., 150 F.T.C. 694 (2010) (decision and order) (punishing Rite 
Aid’s corporate policies which failed to secure PII). 
 174. Pahl, supra note 170, at 6. 
 175. Id. at 7–8. 
 176. FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN 
A CONNECTED WORLD 28–31 (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files 
/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-
workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf. 
440 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 19:2 
 
practices before taking a deep dive focusing on the experiences 
of AdvaMed and Eskenazi Health and concluding with an 
analysis of global developments as they pertain to cybersecurity 
due diligence. 
A. A LOOK AT MEDICAL INDUSTRY CYBERSECURITY BEST 
PRACTICES 
When it comes to best practices, we must remind ourselves 
that they are just that—practices rather than rules. Yet as more 
and more medical devices are created to connect with one 
another, the increase in connectivity enlarges the risk to data 
and increases the value of cybersecurity weak points for those 
with malicious intent. That being said, the ever-changing 
landscape forces medical device companies, healthcare delivery 
organizations, and the industry in general to be conscious 
contributors in putting forth recommendations and enacting 
security-prone changes on the individual level177 to constantly 
spur ideas on how to take positive prophylactic measures. 
Today, the public’s expectations for medical devices’ 
capabilities far exceed those of earlier times.178 Whereas early 
devices were standalone, today’s are connected to a broad 
ecosystem, as discussed in Part III. Users can, and oftentimes 
desire to, connect to their healthcare providers, biomedical 
engineers, or other devices to provide a cumulative and 
comprehensive view of their health to others participating in 
delivering the highest levels of care.179 But the cost of this 
exponential connectivity creates many points susceptible to 
cybersecurity threats in various stages, ranging from the chain 
of device creation and production, to connecting with healthcare 
providers and entities, to performing the device’s intended 
function. The preceding section on adapting the NIST CSF and 
following FDA pre- and post-market guidance provide some of 
the strongest defense mechanisms in the campaign against 
cybersecurity threats, but this section aims to further detail best 
practices as seen in the industry of medical devices specifically. 
Starting with the inception of a medical device, 
manufacturers can and should have the foresight to understand 
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the type of data and environment(s) in which their products 
intend to hold, create, transmit, or store information.180 In our 
current climate, the best practice approach to gauging what 
information should be protected is to have the assumption “that 
assets requiring protection will always be under threat.”181 
Many industry authorities, private and government, promulgate 
the concept that testing for risk and safety analyses throughout 
the lifecycle of manufacture is a critical way to detect and 
mitigate present and future threats and vulnerabilities.182 The 
best way to plan for an inevitable cybersecurity threat is to 
embed defensive infrastructure during the design phase(s), 
rather than posing threats and recovery options as 
afterthoughts; in other words, the best firms build in 
cybersecurity from the start, they do not bolt it on as an 
afterthought.183 Industry professionals have supported 
strategies to secure medical device software through 
strengthening the operating system and implementing security 
technologies like firewalls.184 From a physical standpoint, 
manufacturers should minimize attack surface of devices 
requiring them to contain the minimal components needed for 
design as well as closing any ports that would otherwise remain 
open.185 Every phase throughout a medical device’s life, from 
creation to disposal, needs to be tested and accounted for in 
terms of risks. 
The responsibility of designing and building secure devices 
can be executed through contractual agreements deferring 
responsibility to manufacturers rather than consumers, whether 
                                                          
 180. Fubin Wu & Sherman Eagles, Cybersecurity for Medical Device 
Manufacturers: Ensuring Safety and Functionality, 50 BIOMED. 
INSTRUMENTATION & TECH. 23, 25–26 (2016), http://s3.amazonaws.com/rdcms-
aami/files/production/public/FileDownloads/BIT/2016_BIT_JF_Cybersecurity
Manufacturers.pdf (explaining cybersecurity risk analysis). 
 181. Id. 
 182. See generally HEALTH CARE INDUS. CYBERSEC. TASK FORCE, supra note 
10; Wu & Eagles, supra note 180. 
 183. HEALTH CARE INDUS. CYBERSEC. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 38; 
Kevin Fu & James Blum, Controlling for Cybersecurity Risks of Medical Device 
Software, HORIZONS, Spring 2014, at 38, http://s3.amazonaws.com/rdcms-
aami/files/production/public/FileDownloads/HT_Cybersecurity/2014_HorSpr_S
oftware_Risks.pdf. 
 184. Ron Mehring & Axel Wirth, Medical Device Patch Management: 
Factors for Strategy and Execution, Speech at HIMSS Conference (Mar. 1, 
2016), http://www.himssconference.org/sites/himssconference/files/pdf/20.pdf. 
 185. Id. 
442 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 19:2 
 
that be hospitals or other types of healthcare delivery 
organizations. Contracts that put the responsibility to design 
information security and privacy standards on manufacturers 
will place the onus on the medical device industry to take 
cybersecurity into consideration at all levels of product research 
and design, hopefully in greater emphasis than what attention 
is dedicated to cybersecurity now.186 Through these 
responsibility agreements, every system level of a medical device 
can be penetration-tested during the design and manufacture, 
even verified with certification, to ensure the integrity, security, 
and privacy of the device before it is released on the market.187 
If weaknesses or flaws are revealed throughout the process, 
consumers can work with manufacturers, in order to stress and 
uphold the principles of protecting patient safety and the 
integrity of the technology. 
Once on the market, manufacturers should not be let off the 
hook in terms of assessing for potential threats and 
vulnerabilities. Assuming a medical device is securely designed 
and even more so in the event the device was not assessed for 
risk during its design, manufacturers should be involved with 
their healthcare delivery organizations in the lifecycle 
management of their medical devices. Best practices for 
manufacturers should include constant monitoring of threats 
and vulnerabilities to their devices in production and on the 
market, and then reporting such detected threats and 
vulnerabilities to their consumers and affected public.188 Patches 
need to be developed by manufacturers in response, then need to 
be sent to the appropriate channels that can deploy them among 
the threatened devices to mitigate any risks moving forward.189 
As was discussed in Part II, patching is easier said than 
done, but it is critical to maintaining an up-to-date secure 
medical device. For best practices purposes, disseminating and 
implementing patches by both the manufacture and healthcare 
delivery organization in a timely fashion is of the utmost 
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importance.190 A delayed patch deployment may result in a 
situation such as Wannacry; the patch that would have 
prevented the Wannacry incident was released over a month 
prior to the attack yet was not deployed by hospital 
administrators.191 Granted, deploying patches in hospital 
operating systems may be relatively easy in comparison to 
certain medical devices (i.e. ones implanted in the human body), 
the same concept applies in that patching sooner than later is in 
the interest of the patient’s safety. Industry professionals 
recommend, and some healthcare delivery organizations have 
gone as far as, to implement a patch management program, 
“triaging” risks and determining the order of patch deployment 
according to network and data exposure, likelihood of a breach 
occurring, and the potential impact it could have on the entity.192 
Patching is even more important when considering the 
actual lifespans of medical devices. There is a common 
misconception that, because new medical devices are always 
being developed, these new products are being quickly adopted. 
In reality, medical devices (along with Electronic Health Record 
systems) are being used, in some cases, anywhere from ten to 
twenty or more years due to budgetary restraints faced by 
hospitals.193 Operating systems may be newer or updated more 
frequently, but the vendors that supply the devices or their 
respective patchwork may have been developed according to 
previous versions of operating systems;194 such misalignment 
jeopardizes strategic plans to secure the full lifecycles of medical 
devices. Thus, maintaining a relationship with vendors and 
manufacturers to provide the latest software updates compatible 
with the healthcare delivery organization or the medical device 
itself is crucial in protecting the longevity of devices.195 Further, 
as long as the software patch is designed to address security 
issues and does not change the function of the medical device, 
manufacturers will not be burdened by having to attain 
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recertification or approval by the FDA; as was discussed in Part 
III, manufacturers only need to test the patch to ensure it does 
not have negative outcomes on the device.196 
Cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities will occur no 
matter how much a product is designed to withstand an attack 
or whether it is updated like clockwork with respect to 
appropriate patches. Security incidents will happen, but, at the 
very least, manufacturers should have a vulnerability disclosure 
policy in the event that an attack threatens the public safety of 
its consumers.197 In October 2016, on the heels of the St. Jude 
pacemaker issues coming to light, Johnson & Johnson (J&J) may 
have been the first in its industry to proactively come forth in 
issuing a warning to patients about the “cyber vulnerability” of 
their OneTouch Ping insulin pumps.198 The medical devices at 
stake were insulin pumps that connect to the patient’s body and 
inject insulin through catheters controlled by a wireless 
remote.199 Due to the device’s communication not being 
encrypted, testing confirmed that a hacker could manipulate the 
pump to dose insulin, thus posing potentially life-threatening 
consequences.200 While J&J believed there were no attempted 
hacks on any of the 114,000 patients who used the OneTouch 
Ping, J&J decided to warn all those patients and provide advice 
on how to fix the problem.201 Ultimately, the FDA lauded J&J 
about their forthcomingness, supporting the hopeful transition 
from companies and organizations generally hiding negative 
“cyber vulnerabilities” to the practice of executing disclosure 
procedures about confirmed threats.202 It should be best practice 
to disclose warnings and follow-up recommendations to remedy 
medical device vulnerabilities “in a way that best protects 
patients.”203 
Again, despite the lengths taken to assess and mitigate 
cybersecurity risks in design and through constant patching, 
cyber attacks are inevitable, and much is still to be learned about 
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how to best react to adverse events. Information sharing as an 
industry-wide best practice has the potential to assist all types 
of healthcare organizations: large and small, public or private. 
Institutions like the National Health Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center (NH-ISAC) enable any non-profit or for-profit 
healthcare stakeholder—including healthcare providers, 
insurers, biotech firms, laboratories, medical schools, medical 
device manufacturers, and more—to participate in a “forum for 
sharing cyber and physical threat indicators, best practices and 
mitigation strategies.”204 NH-ISAC’s goals include securing 
personal health information and complying with standards and 
regulations in HIPAA to further protect patient safety and lives 
while our world continues progress in healthcare through 
medical devices and such technology.205 
Regardless of whether one is a voluntary member of NH-
ISAC, information sharing can be helpful for any organization or 
healthcare stakeholder. Creating a baseline of information on 
cybersecurity risk management that any size or type of 
healthcare organization can tailor to their needs is a start.206 
Many healthcare organizations are small-to-medium-sized 
businesses that lack the staff, resources, and infrastructure to 
combat a potential cybersecurity incident, but if an information 
sharing system were in place, these smaller entities could 
greatly benefit whether in receiving information about real-time 
threat indicators or using the strategies of cybersecurity experts 
at other healthcare organizations that have already faced 
similar scenarios.207 To have strength in numbers and share 
these strategies, the FDA has recognized the need for 
transparent dialogue, and, thus, does not intend to enforce 
certain reporting requirements of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act for companies that voluntarily participate in 
specific institutions, including the NH-ISAC.208 
Ultimately, though, even if best practices are implemented 
by norm entrepreneurs, there will still be a gap, resulting in a 
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lack of mandatory requirements to hold medical device 
manufacturers or healthcare delivery organizations accountable 
for security lapses. Between the FDA covering safety and 
effectiveness, HHS’s enforcement of HIPAA, and the Joint 
Commission’s Standard for Medical Equipment Safety, medical 
devices only need to abide by floor standards to avoid statutory 
breaches rather than being required to invest in proactive 
cybersecurity best practices.209 While medical device 
cybersecurity legislation has yet to be passed, in 2017, the HHS’s 
Health Care Industry Cybersecurity Task Force encouraged 
healthcare providers to collaborate among departments; 
including leadership, biomedical engineering teams, IT staff, 
and IT security, when it comes to the selection, deployment, and 
maintenance of medical devices.210 The Task Force promotes the 
creation of a Medical Computer Emergency Readiness Team 
(MedCERT) within healthcare organizations, with teams 
specifically concentrated on medical devices to focus on potential 
impacts to patient safety when vulnerabilities to medical devices 
are disclosed and/or exploited.211 The establishment of 
MedCERT teams is designed in the interest of protecting 
national security, as they would be the “go-team[s]” in the event 
of a medical device exploit tasked with “assess[ing] 
vulnerabilities, evaluat[ing] any patient safety risks, serv[ing] 
as an adjudicator between the vulnerability finder and the 
product manufacturer, assess[ing] proposed mitigations, and 
serv[ing] in a consultation role for organizations navigating the 
coordinated vulnerability process.”212 Just as privacy concerns 
exploded in the 1990s, in response to which HIPAA designated 
mandatory privacy officers in all healthcare organizations,213 
MedCERT might be the teams created in response to the rising 
levels of cyber threats to medical devices. 
Looking ahead, the multi-faceted cyber threat to medical 
devices will likely continue to increase as the IoT universe 
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expands. Public and private entities have already joined forces 
to innovate on the subject, such as the Medical Device 
Innovation Safety & Security Consortium (MDISS). Established 
in 2010, MDISS is a nonprofit, public/private partnership, and 
the first of its kind to focus exclusively on medical device 
cybersecurity.214 Under a 1.8 million dollar contract with the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity Division, 
MDISS has built a medical device cyber risk assessment 
platform furthering the collaboration and sharing of critical 
information between stakeholders like healthcare organizations, 
medical device manufacturers, technology firms, and even the 
NH-ISAC.215 Moreover, in 2017, MDISS built over a dozen World 
Health Information Security Testing Labs (WHISTL), in which 
the “facilities will comprise a federated network of medical 
device security testing labs . . . . Enabling MDISS members to 
test devices in both physical and virtual environments, WHISTL 
facilities will focus on identifying and mitigating medical device 
vulnerabilities, sharing solutions and best practices, and device 
security education and awareness.”216 Successes of the 
organization’s initiative have been tangibly measured in 
participant hospitals, including efforts by Eskenazi Health and 
its respective Certified Biomedical Equipment Technician 
Manager/Clinical Engineer, Benjamin Esslinger, which is 
shared later in greater detail.217 The mission and goals of 
organizations like MDISS exemplify and execute best practice 
standards in upholding the cybersecurity of medical devices—
from testing and developing safety protocols, sharing 
information on how to mitigate and react to threats, and even 
recognizing and acting on the importance of cross-collaboration 
between public, private, and government efforts—these 
practices help promote a future state in which expected cyber-
attacks can be mitigated. Already, through the work of MDISS—
along with AdvaMed, highlighted next—real progress is being 
made. 
                                                          
 214. See MDISS, MDISS, https://www.mdiss.org/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2018). 
 215. MDISS Launches ‘Whistl’ Network of Security Testing Labs for Medical 
Devices, MDISS (July 27, 2017), https://www.mdiss.org/news/mdiss-launches-
whistl-network-of-security-testing-labs-for-medical-devices. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
448 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 19:2 
 
B. ADVAMED ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 
This section focuses in particular on the efforts of AdvaMed 
within the wider context of organizations working on the topic of 
healthcare cybersecurity. To be clear, AdvaMed is far from alone 
in this ecosystem. The Medical Device Manufacturers 
Association (MDMA) and the Medical Imaging and Technology 
Alliance (MITA) are also important partners, but the latter 
focuses mostly, unsurprisingly, on imaging technologies. Yet this 
group has important power when it comes to medical device 
cybersecurity due to the fact that it is a standards body. In 
particular, the Manufacturer Disclosure Statement for Medical 
Device Cybersecurity is an important data point in helping to 
frame a standard of cybersecurity care for medical device 
firms.218 
AdvaMed works with these groups on different policies and 
leads in particular on policy matters given its deep interaction 
on Capitol Hill and with the FDA. In particular, AdvaMed’s 
Cybersecurity Foundational Principles have been influential, 
both in the U.S. and abroad. These Principles were developed in 
the aftermath of the Muddy Waters Report involving St. Jude 
pacemakers discussed above.219 There was some haste in 
developing these principles, according to Rothstein, meaning 
that some important issues like supply chain cybersecurity did 
not necessarily get the attention they deserved; in fact, “supply 
chain” is not even mentioned in the Principles. But these 
foundational principles, which are in turn based on the NIST 
CSF, will, in time, be expanded. “I would anticipate supply chain 
being within the next two issues that we tackle as an industry,” 
said Rothstein.220 
Best practices like the AdvaMed Principles can be spread 
more quickly by the advent of new information-sharing 
organizations, like the new Healthcare Coordinating Council 
under NH-ISAC.221 The Council is intended, according to 
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Rothstein, to “coordinate all of the different players in the 
healthcare community in relation to cybersecurity.”222 This 
group is also likely to take on the issue of supply chain 
cybersecurity risk management in the medical device context, 
perhaps even more so than AdvaMed given that it is comprised 
of associations rather than individual members.223 As Rothstein 
explains, “it can be tough to tackle cross-cutting issues like 
supply chain cybersecurity with diverse members like Intel and 
Medtronic playing in the same pool.”224 
Rothstein does not think that new legislation is needed in 
this space—at least on the security side.225 Rothstein, however, 
has expressed one exception: “When it comes to cybersecurity, 
Congress could help with federal structure, particularly at 
establishing a more hierarchical structure at HHS.”226 Such a 
move would reportedly be well-received by AdvaMed members 
and the broader healthcare community, particularly in the 
confusion after Spectre and Meltdown, and earlier WannaCry, 
came to light.227 According to Rothstein: “That’s where Congress 
could really help out.”228 Rothstein further stated: “Two-factor 
authentication doesn’t make sense across the board—yes for in 
the home, not necessarily in operating rooms where seconds 
matter—but I think we need to establish an appropriate, clear 
federal structure to meet these threats.”229 Even though this is 
unlikely in the near term, AdvaMed reports that the group is 
just as busy in 2018 as they were during the Obama 
Administration’s second term, with new substantive rules 
coming from the FDA, including an update on premarket 
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cybersecurity activities to reflect current best practices for 
designers that currently dates to 2014.230 
C. ESKENAZI EXPERIENCE 
When reviewing the role played by industry best practices 
in medical device cybersecurity, it is helpful to include the 
perspective of a leading hospital system. Eskenazi Health is 
based in Indianapolis, Indiana, has been in operation for nearly 
160 years, and currently provides treatment to nearly one 
million outpatients annually.231 The system opened a new 315-
bed hospital in 2013,232 which required a large amount of 
procurement. During that phase, “the focus was not 
cybersecurity of medical devices, it was on getting a hospital 
started,” according to Benjamin G. Esslinger, Clinical Engineer 
Manager of Eskenazi.233 To help allay any resulting 
cybersecurity concerns, Eskenazi has used a variety of tools to 
help secure its Internet of Medical Devices.234 The hospital 
bifurcates the responsibility for security between the IT systems 
touching Eskenazi’s networks and the biomedical engineering 
department that assesses the security of procurement.235 In 
particular, the engineering department utilizes the Medical 
Device Risk Assessment Platform, which is also aligned with the 
NIST CSF, and takes the form of a pre-procurement 
questionnaire to ensure that new medical devices meet a 
minimum-security baseline.236 According Esslinger, however, it 
is still necessary to prioritize mitigation strategies for the most 
vulnerable devices.237 
One element that helps improve security across Eskenazi’s 
networks is the fact that they do not have a test environment; 
instead, the hospital system relies on manufacturers obtaining 
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an approved patch238—echoing concerns discussed in Part III 
about this aspect of medical device cybersecurity. And even 
though partitioning networks can help cordon off threats, there 
is also the concern of “death by segmentation” in which every 
network has to be on its own network. Replacing a whole 
network of devices is not an option given the large outlay that 
would take. And there are still larger industry problems to 
address. According to Esslinger: “Manufactures are still selling 
devices with unsupported operating systems. So, in that case, 
how do you mitigate the threat?”239 The unspoken answer seems 
to be through best practices in procurement, and sharing 
information with peers. In fact, Eskenazi shares best practices, 
including with regards to procurement, through the MDISS 
(MDRAP) Community of Practice, and the Indiana Biomedical 
Society through educational workshops.240 Yet information is 
not readily attainable by manufacturers, underscoring the need 
for healthy two-way communication to promote due diligence in 
the Internet of Healthcare.241 
D. A GLOBAL NOTE 
These are dynamic times when it comes to global 
cybersecurity policy with important new laws in the European 
Union and China unsettling the status quo. First, in the EU, the 
General Data Privacy Directive (GDPR) and the Network 
Information Security (NIS) Directive both have far-reaching 
implications for IoT regulation generally, and medical devices in 
particular.242 Similarly, the new Chinese cybersecurity law will 
likely impact the medical device industry, but it is unclear as of 
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this writing to what extent that will be the case.243 These 
disruptions will make it more difficult in the near term to make 
much progress on global harmonization of cybersecurity best 
practices as applied to the Internet of Healthcare generally, or 
medical devices in particular. From the perspective of 
AdvaMed’s members, though, the U.S. has maintained the best 
regulatory regime, driven by the FDA.244 According to Rothstein: 
“They’ve been really engaged with industry, but also with the 
broader ecosystem (including with hospitals, even though they 
don’t regulate them).”245 
But as for the potential of blockchain to enhance medical 
device cybersecurity, Rothstein, at least, is not yet convinced: 
“From what I’ve seen so far, I don’t think that blockchain will be 
a game-changer for the healthcare system.”246 However, he 
hedged his conclusion a bit with the insight that healthcare 
organizations often follow the movements of major financial 
firms, saying: “So, if more financial firms start to incorporate 
blockchain, will likely see that flow into healthcare.”247 The 
rapid pace at which the financial industry is embracing 
blockchain, then, may push the healthcare sector to similarly 
explore its applications, including in the supply chain context.248 
More exciting at present, at least for Rothstein, are the prospects 
for machine learning and artificial intelligence, which are topics 
deserving of further research in the healthcare context.249 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored cybersecurity vulnerabilities in 
the healthcare sector with a particular emphasis on the thorny 
problem of managing supply chains. As we have seen, new 
technologies like blockchain can help manufacturers and other 
healthcare stakeholders mitigate cyber risk, but only to a point. 
In the end, it is vital for these organizations to take lessons from 
other firms like J&J and invest in proactive cybersecurity best 
practices while taking cybersecurity seriously as part of its 
corporate social responsibility.250 This is part and parcel of an 
ecosystem-based approach to security the Internet of Healthcare 
drawing from analogies such as sustainable development in an 
effort to promote cyber peace. As more organizations embrace 
such a proactive approach discussed in Part IV, they can become 
norm entrepreneurs, as Eskenazi Health and AdvaMed have 
done, establishing “new normative standards” for industry.251 
Eventually, after a tipping point is reached, such bottom-up 
efforts could catalyze positive network effects and even cause a 
“norm cascade” in which normative standards, in this context 
cybersecurity best practices related to supply chain 
management, become internalized and perhaps eventually 
codified in national and international laws benefiting global 
cybersecurity through polycentric action.252 
In some respects, supply chains are like living organisms: 
externally, they look like self-contained entities, but internally, 
they are multifarious systems that depend upon the proper 
functioning of many invisible sub-systems. Vulnerabilities in 
these sub-systems don’t tend to announce themselves. Disease 
can long lay dormant and then strike without warning. As a 
consequence, there is no quick or simple way to make medical 
device supply chains more robust and impervious to attack. But 
as challenging as it is, the problem’s implications for public 
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health demand our attention, resources, and creativity. 
Blockchain is unlikely to be a panacea, but it seems worth 
exploring as part of a package of technological advancements 
and regulatory reforms aimed at securing the Internet of 
Healthcare. 
 
